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SURVIVING FICTIONS
It is sometimes asserted that the use of fiction in law is now prac-
tically obsolete; a thing of the past. Thus, Mr. Odgers says: "Legal
fictions have well-nigh disappeared."' But this strong statement is
erroneous. Instances of old fictions which are still in common use
will be given in a later part of this paper.
Moreover, the law is not only encumbered by old fictions, but is in
danger of having new ones foisted upon it. Mr. Bentham, who died
in 1832, did not believe that the crime of inventing a new fiction was
likely ever again to be committeed.2  But he was mistaken. Twenty-
five years after his death the English courts invented and applied what
Sir Frederick Pollock calls "one of the most brilliant and successful
fictions of the common law," viz., "the implied warranty of authority
which is attached to the acts of a professed agent."3  And Sir Freder-
ick Pollock, in calling attention to this instance, expresses his dissent
from Maine's view that there is now "left no room for fictions."
4
In the past there have been two principal reasons for employment
of fictions in law.
First. To cure deficiencies in the law of procedure.
Second. To conceal the fact that judges, by their decisions, are
making or changing the substantive law.
As to the first reason. Under the old law, in its literal and rigid
form, there was, in many just cases, no remedy whatever. The law
of procedure needed amendment. But legislation was "exceptional
and occasional,"8 and the desirable amendments had to be made by
the judges, or not at all.7 The judges, however, did not openly and
directly assert their right to invent or change law as to procedure. 8
W . B. Odgers, in A. D. 1900: "A Century of Law Reform," 40.
2 See I Bentham, Works (ed. 1843) 268-269.3 Collen v. Wright (1857) 8 El. & Bl. 647; since affirmed in the House of
Lordi, Starkey v. Bank of England, L. R. [1903] App. Cas. 114.
4 Pollock, The Expansion of the Common Law (1904) 135-136.
See 30 HARV. L. REv. 244-245.
o Pollock, op. cit. 49.
T2 Austin, Jurisp. (3d ed.) 632.
8A broadel ground as to judicial power and duty has, in late years, been
taken by one court at least. It is asserted that there is a "judicial duty of
subordinating legal machinery to legal rights"; that it is the duty of the court
to invent and use convenient procedure for ascertaining and establishing rights
and obtaining remedies; that "parties are entitled to the most just and conven-
ient procedure that can be invented"; and that courts should distinctly recognize
"the judicial duty of allowing a convenient procedure, as a necessary incident
of the administration of the law of rights."
See the opinions of Doe, C. J. in Metcalf v. Gilmore (1879) 59 N. H. 417,
431-435; Walker v. Walker (1885) 63 N. H. 321, 326; Owen v. Weston (1885)
63 N. H. 599, 600-604; Boody v. Watson (1886) 64 N. H. 162, 171-172. See also
Memoir of Judge Doe by Professor Hening in 8 Great American Lawyers, 247-
257, and 317.
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Instead, they resorted to the aid of fiction to bring about practical
changes. While not professedly altering the old forms of action, or
adding new forms, the old forms "were adapted to new cases by
means of fictions." Fictions as to procedure
"often proved, in the hands of Judges, instruments for accom-
plishing useful reforms, long before direct sanction could be
obtained for such reforms from the Legislature."'"
"But while the legal fiction may, for the time being, have
served a useful function, we agree with Professor Hepburn
that 'the price paid for it was very high.' ",1
The first reason for employment of fiction has no longer great
influence. In very recent times the defects in the law of procedure
have been largely remedied by legislation. There is now, in most
jurisdictions, a comparatively simplified system, either regulated in
its details by express legislative enactment, or regulated by rules of
court framed by judges under the express authority of the legis-
lature. 12  There is now comparatively little need for judges to employ
fiction as to that subject. But the fiction phrases and fiction reasons
formerly employed are not entirely banished from the law books.'3
As to the second reason for the use of fiction, viz., to conceal the
fact that the judges, by their decisions, are making or changing the
substantive law.14
"There are, at least, three different theories as to judicial law-
making."1 5
9 See Hepburn, Historical Development of Code Pleading (1897) ss. 24, 25.loW D. Lewis, 1 JuRx-,. Soc. PAPERS, 374.
n See Hepburn, op. cit. ss. 24, 25, 27. As to the evils accompanying the use
of fiction, see post in the present paper.
'" See Prof. Roscoe Pound, Regulation of Judicial Procedure by Rules of
Court (1916) 10 ILL. L. REv. 163.
" "The simplification of pleading in modern times has tended to diminish the
operation of fiction strictly so called, although the effect of its former prevalence
is probably ineradicable." Broom, Legal Maxims (8th ed.) 107.
"The forms of action we have buried, but they still rule us from their
graves" Prof. Maitland, Equity and Forms of Action, 296.
"Forms of action are dead, but their ghosts still haunt the precincts of the
law." Prof. John W. Salmond, Observations on Trover and Conversion (1905)
21 LAW QUART. REv. 43.
14 Upon the question whether judges "make" law, some important conflicting
authorities are collected in Prof. E. Wambaugh, Study of Cases (2d ed.) s. 78,
n 2.
For a recent and very interesting discussion of the subject, see the article by
Judge John E. Young on The Law as an Expression of Community Ideals and
the Lawmaking Functions of Courts (November, 1917) 27 YALE LAW JoURNAL,
1. 22-31
Is This summary is taken from a paper by the present writer in 27 HARV. L.
REv 365-366. And see the present writer's paper, Jones v. Hulton: Three Con-flicting Judicial Views as to a Question of Defamation (1912) 60 U. OF PA. L.
Rv 461, 467.
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1. That judges cannot "make" law; that they merely discover and
apply law which has always existed.1
2. That judges can and do make new lav on subjects not covered
by previous decisions, but that judges cannot unmake old law-cannot
even change an existing rule of judge-made law.17.
3. That judges can and do make new law; and also can and do
unmake old law, i. e., the law previously laid down by themselves or
by their judicial predecessors.
We adopt the third view. But for present purposes, it is not abso-
lutely essential to consider whether the third view is to be preferred
to the second, for those who adopt the second view generally concede
that a large part of the law now administered by the courts consists
of additions made-and rightly made-by judges in the way of supple-
menting and enlarging the law as originally stated.'9 And candid
advocates of the second view must concede that judges, in general,
do not frankly admit that the law is thus being changed by their
decision, but that, on the contrary, judges frequently use fiction
phrases to conceal the fact of such changes, making the fictitious
assumption that no change has been made, by addition or in any other
manner, in the law as formerly laid down.
The authorities cited below distinctly admit that fiction is fre-
quently resorted to in the attempt to conceal the fact that the law is
undergoing alteration at the hands of the judges.
"A legal fiction is a device which attempts to conceal the
fact that a judicial decision is not in harmony with the existing
law. The only use and purpose, upon the last analysis, of any
16 See the posthumously published work of Mr. James C. Carter, one of the
greatest lawyers of his day, on Law, Its Origin, Growth and Function (1908).
', See Prof. A. V. Dicey in The Relation between Law and Public Opinion in
England, Chap. XI: and more fully in the Appendix, 481-493.
"The courts cannot contradict what has already been settled as law, but the
power of taking up fresh material is still alive. . . ." Pollock, Expansion of
the Common Law, 15.
"Judges may supplement and enlarge the law as they find it. . . but they
must not reverse what has been settled." Pollock, ibid, 49. Cf. Salmond, Jurisp.
(ed. 1902) 108, 170, 171.18 See Prof. John C. Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law (1909) ss.
215-231, 465-512, 545-550, 628-636.
19 Thus, Prof. Dicey, a prominent advocate of the second view, says that a
large part of the law under which we live8consists of rules to be collected from the judgments of the court. This portion
of the law has not been created by Act of Parliament, and is not recorded in
the statute book. It is the work of the courts; it is recorded in the Reports;
it is, in short, the fruit of judicial legislation. . . . Nine-tenths, at least, of
the law of contract, and the whole, or nearly the whole, of the law of torts are
not to be discovered in any volume of the statutes." Dicey, The Relation between
Law and Public Opinion in England, 359, 360. And see also pp. 484, 490, 492.
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legal fiction is to nominally conceal this fact that the law has
undergone a change at the hands of the judges." 2
"But I now employ the expression 'Legal Fiction' to signify
any assumption which conceals, or affects to conceal, the fact
that a rule of law has undergone alteration, its letter remaining
unchanged, its operation being modified."
(Then, after referring to the English case-law, and the Roman
responsa prudentum as resting on fictions) :
"The fact is in both cases that the law has been wholly
changed; the fiction is that it remains what it always was." 21.
"For though it is . . . a duty imposed upon English
judges, within certain limits, to make new laws, it is against the
tradition of their office ever to avow it. By saying, therefore,
that there is malice in law, or fraud in law, they pretend that
there is malice, or fraud, or whatever else they think unneces-
sary, when there is really none at all." 22
Fictions include
"any assumption which conceals a change of law by retaining
the old formula after the change has been made." 2
The result
"is the expansion of law, whilst leaving it formally intact." 2
"The expedient of fictions . . . occasionally employed
to introduce by stealth real innovations, . . ." .
"It is true that at many times the Courts have been over-
anxious to avoid the appearance of novelty; and the shifts to
which they resorted to avoid it have encumbered the Common
Law with several of the fictions which Maine denounces (p. 28)
as almost hopeless obstacles to an orderly distribution of its
contents." 2
As to why a judge, in innovating on existing law, has so often
sought to accomplish his object through the medium of fiction, Austin
suggests as one reason:
"A wish to conciliate (as far as possible) the friends or
lovers of the law which [he] really annulled . . . By cover-
ing the innovation with a decent lie, he treated the abrogated
law with all seemly respect, whilst he knocked in on the head." 27
2' Mr 0. R. 'Mitchell, The Fictions of the Law: Have They Proved Useful or
Dctrimental to its Growth? (1893) 7 HAiv. L. REv. 249, 262.
21 Maine, Ancient Law (1st ed.) 26.
2 Markby, Elements of Law (3d ed.) s. 688. And compare 2 Chamberlayne,
Mod, Law of Ezid. s. 1164, n. 4.
23 10 Ency. Brit. (11th ed.) 319.
24 Pulszky, Theory of Lau, and Cizil Liberty, 431.
25 Phelps, Judicial Equity Abridged, s. 149.
" Sir F. Pollock, Notes on Maine's 'Ancient Law' (1905) 21 LAw QuART.
Rr%. 165, 172.
272 Austin, Jurisp. (3d ed,) 630.
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The assertion that law is not changed by decisions of judges, is
now the most effective and the most frequently applied of all legal
fictions, and much harm results from its use.
Some eminent jurists are very far from advocating the abolition
of all existing fictions. On the contrary, they use language implying
that the use of fiction is not necessarily and invariably objectionable,
and giving the impression that, if the introduction of fictions in law
were now urged for the first time, it might sometimes be expedient to
employ them. The language of such high authorities as Bishop, Pollock
and Gray can be so understood. 28
These great lawyers grew up under a system where the use of fic-
tion was frequent. They were habituated to its employment. They
saw that its use at an earlier day had in some respect been beneficial,
and, indeed, was often said to have been indispensable. They did not
always realize the accompanying disadvantages: that "the price paid
was very high," 29 involving confusion of thought, and a long period
subsequently required for clearing the air. If the introduction of
fiction in law were now urged for the first time, it is difficult to con-
ceive how much eminent jurists would answer some of Mr. Bentham's
anti-fiction arguments. It is not easy to escape from some of his
dilemmas.
If the fiction is not founded on truth, its use is unjustifiable. If it
is founded on truth its use is foolish:
"What you are thus doing with the lie in your mouth-had
you power to do it without the lie?-your lie is a foolish one.
Have you no such power ?-it is a flagitious one." 80
2"One of the most interesting features of our law is its fictions. Not quite
all of them are useful and wise, but most are, and some of them are so essential
that they could be dispensed with only at great inconvenience. Bishop, Con-
tracts (2d ed.) s. 182.
As to Pollock's views, see Expansion of the Common Law, 135-136, and op.
cit. 21 LAw QuARr. Rav. 165, 173.
Professor Gray, following Ihering, divides fictions into two classes, "historic
fictions" and "dogmatic fictions." He regards the former class as objectionable,
but the lattes as sometimes laudable. But it is, however, interesting to observe
that Professor Gray, after saying that the dogmatic fictions
"are to be praised when skilfully and wisely used," adds-"Yet though handy,
they are dangerous tools. They should never be used, as the historic fictions
were used, to change the Law, but only for the purpose of classifying estab-
lished rules, and one should always be ready to recognize that the fictions are
fictions, and be able to state the real doctrine for which they stand." Gray,
Nature and Sources of the Law (1909) s. 89.
2' See Prof. Hepburn quoted in the article by the present writer, Tort and
Absolute Liability-Suggested Changes in Classification (1917) 30 HARv. L. Rzv.
241, 245.302 Bentham, Works (ed. 1843) 466, n.
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"What you have been doing by the fiction--could you, or
could you not, have done it without the fiction? If not, your
fiction is a wicked lie. If yes, a foolish one."
"Such is the dilemma. Lawyer! escape from it if you
can." 31
If a fiction does not, in any degree or to any extedt, represent a
legal truth, it would seem that its continued use can result only in
evil. If, on the other hand, it does represent some clumsily conceded
legal truth, then it belongs to a class of fictions which Mr. Bentham
had in mind when he said:
"Not a fiction but is capable of being translated, and occa-
sionally is translated, into the language of truth. Burn the
original, . . . and employ the translation in its stead. Fiction
is no more necessary to justice than poison is to sustenance." 32
We may remark, in passing, that Mr. Bentham's vigorous attack
on fictions, like his onslaught on other abuses, is marred by "unneces-
sary violence of diction," and by the imputation of improper motives
in his opponents.34
But it may be asked: Why banish from the law all old fictions?
Why not retain two classes? First. Those which are merely exag-
gerated forms of statement, which would never be understood or
applied in their full literal sense. Second. Where the result reached
by the use of fictions is substantially correct, although the method of
reaching it is objectionable, involving erroneous reasoning or confusing
statements.
As to the first class. There are undoubtedly some so-called fictions,
which are practically harmless. They are a kind of "legal shorthand";
intentional overstatements for the purpose of attracting attention ,'
obvious exaggerations not likely to mislead; "a figure of speech
designed to set a rule of law in a striking light." Sometimes they are
merely the "condensed expression of a rule of law," 36 and it has been
asserted that fiction "too barefaced to deceive anyone may fairly be
called innocent." 27 But a large proportion of existing fictions cannot
be explained, or their use justified, on these grounds.
3,7 Bentham, Works (ed. 1843) 283.
326 Bentham, Works (ed. 1843) 582.
'3See Atkinson, Life of Bentham, 225.
s' For example, he calls "legal fiction" "the most pernicious and the basest
sort of lying," 6 Bentham, Works (ed. 1843) 582. And he fufther says:
"It affords presumptive and conclusive evidence of moral turpitude in those
by whom it was invented and first employed." 9 Bentham, Works (ed. 1843) 77.
"See as to maxims the present writer's article on The Use of Maxims in
Jurisprudence (1895) 9 HARv. L. REv. 13, 22-23.
36 10 Ency. Brit. (1lth ed.) 319.37 Pollock, Expansion of the Law, 51.
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As to the second class. Professor Williston has said that
"the result reached by means of fictitious statement must not
be discarded with the fiction when, as has commonly been the
case with fictions in the law, the result reached is desirable
though the mode of statement is confusing." 38
But it does not follow that the fiction phraselogy and fiction rea-
sons should be retained. 9
Two prominent disadvantages result from the use of fictions. They
"are the greatest of obstacles to symmetrical classification." 40 They
tend to prevent investigation as to the fundamental principle under-
lying a rule of law, and to retard the framing of a statement of the
rule in strictly accurate terms. By giving an erroneous reason for the
rule, they make it difficult thoroughly to understand and apply the rule.
Indeed, the adoption of an erroneous reason for a doctrine inevitably
leads to misapplication of the doctrine.41
"Fiction was simply the avoiding of difficulties instead of
the solution of them . . ." It becomes "its purpose merely
to save the trouble of elucidating legal principles .
Further it has the baneful effect of paralyzing and crippling
legal reasoning from sheer considerations of comfort . 42
The use of fiction tends not only to impair, in a general way, rever-
ence for truth; but also to diminish the respect which would otherwise
be felt for the courts and for the law itself. These objections, in
substance, have been urged, not by mere theorists, but by experienced
lawyers and judges.
"The expedient of fictions . . . occasionally employed
to introduce by stealth real innovations, proves only that courts
were more willing to sacrifice truth than form . . . although
said to be invented to 'promote justice,' they were conspicuous
object-lessons in high places of the utility of falsehood and
38Liability for Honest Misrepresentation (1911) 24 HARv. L. REv. 414, 434.
Compare Lord Blackburn in Dalton v. Angius (1881) L. R. 6 App. Cas. 740, 812.
And see Holmes, Cnnnon Law (1881) 375.
•9 One does not wish to see re-introduced "an ingenious but highly artificial
method of arriving at just results . . . now buried in the foundations of
more simple and direct ones." Pollock, Law of Fraud in British India, 41.
40 Maine, Ancient Law (1st ed.) 27-28.
4' "To speak of constructive presence is to use the language of fiction, and so
to hinder precise analysis." Holmes, J., in Hyde v. United States (1912) 225
U. S. 347, 386.
Undoubtedly, the giving of an incorrect reason for a correct doctrine is very
common. Indeed, John Stuart Mill goes so far as to say: "Nine-tenths of all
the true opinions~which are held by mankind are held for wrong reasons."
2 Letters of J. S. Mill, Appendix, 372. And Judge Holmes has said that judges
know which way to decide a good deal sooner than they know how to give the
reason why. But a clear perception of the underlying reason is essential to
the beneficial working of a correct doctrine, and experienced judges have taken
pains to expose "the negation of error upon erroneous grounds."4 2 Pulszky, Theory of Law and Civil Liberty, 435, 436.
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craft. Their influence was sinister. Their example was con-
trary to public policy because hostile to the cultivation of good
faith among men." 13
In opposing the continuing use of fictions, we have not been "slay-
ing the slain." The question of the expediency of employing fictions
is still a living issue in important branches of the law; and is defended
by authorities entitled to respect.
It is now proposed to give some examples of old fictions which are
still in use. The list is not complete. Nor do we claim the merit of
originality in pointing out the fictions or in stating the objections to
their use. Indeed, the criticisms here given are largely in the form of
quotations. In some instances, the use of the fiction has obstinately
persisted. In others, it is gradually diminishing; and, for these last
cases, "decadent fictions" might be a better term than "surviving
fictions." Within the limits of this paper we can do little more than
briefly call attention to the fallacies and mistakes involved in the use
of fiction in the various instances. We cannot now enter upon a
thorough discussion of any particular doctrine or of the ground of it.
We believe that, at the present day, the use of fiction in law should be
entirely abandoned. As was intimated earlier, if a fiction does not, in
any degree or to any extent, represent a legal truth, then its continued
use can result only in evil. If, on the other hand, it represents-in
part at least-some clumsily concealed legal truth, then it is capable
of being translated into the language of truth, and we should adopt
Mr. Bentham's remedy-"Burn the original, and employ the transla-
tion in its stead.." 44 In short, we would entirely discard the use of
fiction phrases and fiction reasons.
If it be granted that fictions were, "at a certain stage of human
development," useful aids in the formation of law, it does not follow
that they should not now be discarded. At most, "they are merely the
scaffolding behind which the house was built, and now that the house
is convenient, and proximately complete, the scaffold may be taken
down." 45 The scaffolding, even if useful in construction, yet, after
the building is erected, serves only "to obscure it." 46
43 Phelps, Judicial Equify Abridged, ss. 149, 150.
"6 Bentham, Works (ed. 1843) 582.
5 j. F Stephen, Dig. of Crim. Law (Am. ed. of 1878) 404, n. xvi, Chap.
XXXII
4 Gray, Nature and Sources of the Law (1909) s. 85.
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SXAMPLUS OP SURVMNG FICTION
EXAMPLE ONX: As to Conclusive Presumption.
The expression "conclusive presumption" might be taken to be a
term used solely in the statement of a rule (a statement of a principle)
in the law of evidence, and not concerned with rules of substantive
law. Even if, however, its application is thus limited, its use would
be open to criticism.'7 But the expression "conclusive presumption"
is used today as a clumsy and roundabout method of stating a rule
of substantive law; or rather, as giving a fiction reason for a rule of
substantive law.
"All conclusive presumptions pertain in form to procedure,
but in effect to substantive law." 48
"Such rules, though in form connected with the law of
Proof, are in truth rules of substantive law disguised in the
language of mere adjective rules." 49
"However the conclusive presumption may be defined or
explained, it is, in reality, a rule of substantive law . . .- o
A conclusive presumption is
"a rule of substantive law masquerading as a rule of evidence."el
"Conclusive evidence is not evidence at all; it is something
which takes the place of evidence and of the thing to be proved
as well." 52
To say that a certain element is implied or presumed
"is only helping out a false theory by a fiction . . When-
ever it is said that a certain thing is essential to liability, but
that it is conclusively presumed from something else, there
is always ground for suspicion that the essential element is to
be found in that something else, and not in what is said to be
presumed from it." 53
'7 "In strictness, there cannot be such a thing as a 'conclusive presumption."'
4 Wigmore, Evid. s. 2492.
Conclusive presumptions are
"almost necessarily more or less false, for it is seldom possible in the subject-
matter of judicial procedure to lay down with truth a general principle that
any one thing is conclusive proof of the existence of any other." Salmond,
Jursp. (ed. 1902) 589.
"For, all that is meant by a conclusive proof, is a proof which the law has
made so. Independently of predetermination that it shall be conclusive, no
inference from one fact to another can be more than probable: Although, in
loose language,, we style the proof conclusive, wherever the probability appears
to be great." 1 Austin, Jurisp. (3d ed.) 508-509.
48 Salmond, Jurisp. (ed. 1902) 580.
4 Kenny, Outlines of Crim. Law (5th ed.) 325.
502 Charberlayne, Mod. Law of Evid. s. 1160.8 Prof. Williston, op. cit.. 24 Hasv. L. REv. 414, 425.
52 Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law, s. 228, p. 99.
13 Holmes, The Common Law (1881) 134.
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"In strictness there cannot be such a thing as a 'conclusive
presumption.' Wherever from one fact another is conclusively
presumed, in the sense that the opponent is absolutely precluded
from showing by any evidence that the second fact does not
exist, the rule really provides that, where the first fact is .shown
to exist, the second fact's existence is wholly immaterial for the
purpose of the proponent's case; 5 and to provide this is to
make a rule of substantive law, and not a rule apportioning the
burden of persuading as to certain propositions or varying the
duty of coming forward with evidence. The term has no place
in the principles of evidence (although the history of a 'con-
clusive presumption' often includes a genuine presumption as its
earlier stage), and should be discarded." 5
The foregoing views are well illustrated by the prevailing fiction
respecting "malice" in the law of defamation, where malice is often
enumerated among the requisites to a prima facie action; but it is said
that malice need not be proved, because its existence is conclusively
presumed. This, of course, means that malice is not a requisite. 6
Judges often fail to admit frankly that the substantive law is being
changed by their decisions, and they sometimes use "fiction phrases"
to conceal the fact of such change. In the instances just discussed,
there is a "tendency to veil the reality under the fiction that they are
merely laying down a rule of evidence." 57
EXAMPLE Two: As to the alleged legal presumption that every
man intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts.
It is sometimes said that a person is presumed in law to intend
the natural and probable consequences of his acts. For such a universal
presumption there is no foundation save in fiction.
Professor George L. Clark says of this "unfortunate maxim":
"If this were taken literally, it is obvious that it would wipe
out the sound and well-settled distinction between intentional
and negligent torts." 5
4 Willard, J., in State v,. Platt (1870) 2 S. C. 150, 154.
"Where several independent acts are required to be performed in order to
accomplish a given result, to say that proof of the performance of one of them
shall be submitted as conclusive proof of the performance of the other, is to
say in effect that one alone is really requisite."
5 4 Wigmore, Evid. s. 2492.
5 As to the old law of defamation regarding malice, the changes in the law,
and the use of fiction phrases to conceal the changes, see citations and comments
in article by the present writer (cited in note 15, supra) in 60 U. or PA. L. Rxv.
365, 370-372, and 461-466 See also 2 Chamberlayne, Mod. Law of Evid. 1452-
1456, See, especially, N. St. John Green, 6 AM. LAw Ray. 597, 609-610; 1 Street,
Foundations of Legal Liability, 317; Gaynor, J., in Prince v. Brooklyn Daily
Eagh (1896) 16 N. Y. Misc. 186, 188.
7 See the present writer (in article cited in note 15, supra) 60 U. or PA. L.
Rav. 461. 465-466
5417 U. OF Mo. Bu. No. 13, p. 30, n. 73; Law Series 12.
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"It is not sufficient to indicate an intentional injury that the
party causing it had reasonable ground to expect that such a
result was -within reasonable probabilities, otherwise a violation
of the duty to exercise ordinary care would, of itself, be suf-
ficient to indicate such injury." t
The so-called presumption "that every man intends the probable
consequences of his acts" is not a rule of law "further or otherwise
than as it is a rule of common-sense." 00
"In fact there is no such legal presumption. It is merely
a presumption of fact which the law sometimes sanctions, or
approves, or allows a jury to act upon. And the admission that
it is an inference of fact and not of law proves that its applica-
tion depends on varying circumstances." 01
"It is not universally true that a man intends the probable
consequences of his act . . . Probable consequences may
result from acts as to which the law, by pronouncing them to be
negligent, expressly negatives intent."
In many cases, undoubtedly, the facts are such as to justify a jury
in finding intent. And, if the facts are so strong that no other finding
could reasonably be made, the judge may be justified in assuming the
existence of intent without submitting that issue to the jury. But
whenever intent is thus inferred, "the'process is one of inference from
fact, not of pre-determination by law." Or, in other words, "the
process is induction from fact, not deduction from arbitrary law." 02
"It is sometimes said that a person is presumed in law to
intend the natural and probable results of his acts. See R. v.
Harvey (1823) 2 B. & C., p. 264. Such a form of statement,
however, is useless and misleading. So far as it is true at all,
it is simply an improper way of saying that a person is respon-
sible for the natural and probable consequences of his acts,
whether he intended them or not. Commonly, it makes no
difference whether a consequence was intended or not, provided
that it was natural and probable; for the same liability exists
in each case. But there are exceptional instances (many of them
in criminal law, and some also in the law of torts) in which the
distinction becomes important-a defendant being liable for
intended consequences but not for others. In such cases the
alleged presumption does not existes and in all other cases it is
unnecessary."
W Marshall, J., in Bolin v'. Chicago, St. P. etc. Ry. (1900) 103 Wig. 333, 352.
e°2 Stephen, Hist. of Crim. Law of Eng. (1883) 111.
61 Peters, C. J., in State v. Hersom (1897) 90 Me. 273. 275.
a See 2 Wharton, Evid. (3d ed.) ss. 1258, 1261, 1262. Also article by the
present writer (cited in note 15, supra) 60 U. PA. L. REv. 365, 384-385.
63 See I Bishop, New Crim. Procedure, s. 97.
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"The only constructive intent really known to the law is in
those branches of the criminal law in which conscious negli-
gence amounting to reckless disregard of consequences is im-
puted to the defendant as an intention to produce these conse-
quences; as in the case of murder, and malicious injury to
person or property. See p. 16, n. 4 above. In other cases the
probability of a consequence may be evidence that it was
intended, but there is no legal presumption to that effect, either
rebuttable or conclusive." 64
"The 'presumption' now under consideration is apparently
a paraphrase of the statement of a very ordinary rule of sub-
stantive law to the effect that one who does an act prohibited
by law takes the risk of all the natural consequences of his act,
and cannot, except where intent is an element of the liability
charged, escape responsibility for the consequences of his con-
duct by saying that they were not embraced within the scope of
his intention. So understood, the maxim is undoubtedly cor-
rect. . . . It suffers, however, from the infirmity that it
has no possible connection with the law of evidence in general
or the subject of presumptions in particular." e6
"Often these maxims and ground principles get expressed in
this form of a presumption perversely and inaccurately, as . . .
when the doctrine that everyone is chargeable with the natural
consequences of his conduct, is expressed in the form th;at
everyone is presumed to intend these consequences. . 66
EXAMPLE THREE: The fiction of constructive intent; considered
especially with reference to the defense of plaintiff's contributory
negligence.
The use of this fiction serves the purpose of concealing the fact
that the judges are now departing from the earlier decisions as to con-
tributory negligence, and are changing the law on that subject.
Formerly, two points seemed tolerably well settled. 1. If defend-
ant intentionally caused damage to plaintiff, he could not set up the
defense that plaintiff's negligence was a contributing cause. 2. But if
defendant negligently caused (was a part of the cause of) damage to
plaintiff, defendant was not liable in case plaintiff's own negligence was
also a part of the cause. As to the second point, the courts were at
first inclined to make a rigid application of the rule in its literal terms.
A plaintiff whose own negligence constituted only a small part of the
compound legal cause of the damage was held barred from recovering
any part of the damage, although the defendant's negligence consti-
tuted a much larger part of the damage and was of a more objection-
64 Salmond, Torts (Ist ed.) 104, n. 3.
652 Chamberlayne, Mod. Law of Evid. s. 1166.
06 Professor J. B. Thayer, Prel. Treatise on Ezid. 335.
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able quality. Negligence of the plaintiff, however small a part of the
compound cause, would always bar his action irrespective of the
quantum or the quality of the defendant's negligence.
This rigid doctrine proved unpopular. The courts gradually came
to hold that a negligent defendant might be barred from setting up the
defense of plaintiff's contributory negligence in certain cases where
defendant's own negligence was of a peculiarly objectionable char-
acter, e. g. in certain cases where defendant, though not desiring to
cause damage, acted with knowledge of the danger and in conscious
disregard of it.6
But the judges did not like to admit frankly that they were thus-
partially, at least-overruling the law as previously laid down. Hence,
some courts said that the defendant in such cases must be regarded,
not as having negligently caused this damage, but as having inten-
tionally caused it. And to sustain this distinction, they resorted to the
fiction of constructive intent. Constructive intention to do harm was
sometimes imputed to a defendant in the admitted absence of actual
intent.6s
At the present time, American courts generally hold that a defend-
ant whose fault is part of the cause of the damage cannot set up the
defense of plaintiff's contributory negligence, if the following propo-
sitions are established (made out) :
6 If a better phrase is desired, the idea might, perhaps, be e:cpressed by the
words---"If defendant is consciously negligent." But it may be a question
whether this expression is sufficiently full or accurate.
"Gross negligence" would not be a satisfactory term. It might be understood
as meaning negligence somewhat greater in degree than plaintiff's negligence,
but not materially differing from it in kind. This has been held an insufficient
description of culpable conduct on the part of a defendant which will bar him
from setting up the defense of plaintiff's contributory negligence. See Knowlton,
C. J., in Banks v. Branian (1905) 188 Mass. 367, 370.
"Aiken v. Holyoke St. R. Co. (1903) 184 Mass. 269, 271, presents a strong
instance.
The idea intended to be conveyed by the term "constructive intent" is some-
times attempted to be expressed by describing defendant's conduct as "wilful,"
or "wanton," or "reckless." But the use of these terms provokes controversy
as to the proper definition of each. "Wilful" is an ambiguous term, liable to
be used in two very opposite senses. (As to different meanings of "wilful"
compare Start, C. J., in Anderson v. Minn. St. P. etc. Ry. (1908) 103 Minn. 224,
228; Jaggard, J., in same case, 230; Black's Law Dictionary, 1242; Klenk v.
Oregon S. L. R. R. (1904) 27 Utah, 428; Southern Ry. v. McNeeley (1909) 44
Ind. App. 126; Barrett v. Cleveland, etc. Ry. (1911) 48 Ind. App. 663; Tinsley
v. Western Union Tel. Co. (1905) 72 S. C. 350.) "Wanton" and "reckless" are
vague, indefinite expressions. It is better to disregard these terms, and, instead,
describe the specific conduct on the part of the defendant which will debar him
from setting up the defense of plaintiff's contributory negligence, c. g. by enu-
merating the four propositions given immediately hereafter in the text.
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1. Defendant was conscious of (was aware of) plaintiff's perilous
position.
2. Defendant realized the substantial danger of harm to plaintiff,
in case defendant should fail to use care.
3. Defendant, although not desiring to cause damage, consciously
failed to use care.
4. (A requisite which would be included by some courts, though
not, perhaps, by all )-Defendant, though not desiring to cause damage,
was indifferent as to whether harm would result from his failure to
use care.
We find no fault with the result now generally reached in cases
including the above four elements.6' But we do question the reasoning
and phraseology sometimes used to sustain this result. The phrase
"constructive intent," as used in reference to such a case, is a fiction.
Upon the best definitions of "intent" and "negligence," the damage in
the above case was not intentionally caused but negligently caused."o
" The view that the presence of these elements furnishes the ratio decidendo
is not always distinctly taken in the opinions. But a careful analysis of the
ca1es decided adversely to the defendant will generally disclose the presence of
at least three of these elements-viz., propositions 1, 2, and 3.
7O There is some conflict of authority as to both definitions.
As to intent: Markby, Salmond and Terry hold that desire to procure a
consequence is an essential element of "intent" to produce it. See Markby,
Elrments of Law (5th ed.) ss. 222, 220; Salmond, Jurisp. (ed. 1902) 415;
Salmond, Torts (4th ed.) 20, 21, 22; Terry, Leading Principles of Anglo-
American Law', 195.
On the other hand, Austin maintains that desire is not an essential element
of intent, but that expectation is sufficient. He virtually says that if a person
thinks that there is any chance, or any appreciable chance, of a certain conse-
quence following his act or omission, then he "intends" that consequence. See
summary of Austin's view in Terry, op. cit. s. 220, founded on I Austin, Jurisp.
(3d ed ) 442, and see 433, 437. Compare Stroud, Mens Rea, 3-6.
We believe the better view is that adopted by Markby, Salmond and Terry.
As to negligence: Wharton, Negligence (1st ed.) s. 3 holds that inadvertence
is an essential element of negligence. The contrary view is taken by Salmond
ard by Shearman and Redfield. They hold, in effect, that a man may be
conscious that be is failing to use proper care, and conscious that this failure
ixolves a substantial risk of harm to others, and yet that resulting harm, if
it is not desired, is to be regarded as negligently caused rather than intentionally
caused. See 1 Shearman and Redfield, Negligence (6th ed.) ss. 3, 5, 6; Salmond,
Jurisp (ed. 1902) 432, 434, 430, 435; Salmond, Torts (1st ed.) 19, and see p. 33,
par. 3. Compare 1 Beven, Negligence (2d ed.) 5.
We think that the latter view is preferable.
In a case including the four propositions ante, it is conceded that the decision
would now be in favor of the plaintiff; the controversy is as to the reason for
this result. How do the above stated conflicting definitions of intent and
negligence bear on this question? Suppose that a judge adopts Markby's defini-
tion of intent and Salmond's definition of negligence. Then, if the judge gives
constructive intent as the basis for his decision, he is consciously resorting to
sheer fiction. Suppose that a judge adopts Austin's definition of intent and
Wharton's definition of negligence. Then, if these definitions are correct, he
has no need to rely upon the fiction of constructive intent, inasmuch as, under
these definitions, there would in this case be actual intent (damage intentionally
caused), But the difficulty is that, according to our view, these alleged funda-
mental definitions are erroneous.
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It is not admissible to manufacture a "hybrid" tort, composed
(theoretically as it were) of both intent and negligence.
"He who causes a result intentionally cannot also have
caused it negligently, and vice versa. . . . Negligence and
wrongful intent are inconsistent and mutually exclusive states of
mind." 71
"As between the two conceptions, conduct must ordinarily
be one or the other. In the very nature of things the same con-
duct cannot be both. And the difficulty cannot be evaded by
resorting to the fiction of constructive intent." 72
It can be urged that negligence, if of a peculiarly objectionable
quality, may be "as bad as intent, in point of moral deserts," 7 or that
"reckless indifference to probable consequences" may be "morally as
bad as an intention to produce those consequences." 74 But it does not
follow that the two things are of the same legal nature, or that they
ought to be called by the same name.
The same fiction reason of constructive intent is sometimes relied
upon in another class of cases where its use is even less defensible
than in the preceding case of the four propositions. Suppose that a
defendant was not aware of plaintiff's perilous position, but would
have discovered it if he had used reasonable care and foresight. Some
courts hold that, even though defendant did not know, yet if he ought
to have known, he is barred from defending on the ground of plain-
tiff's contributory negligence.75
To sustain this result, courts sometimes resort to the fiction reason
of constructive intent. But, even if this reason should be held properly
applicable in the previous case of "conscious negligence," it does not
follow that it is applicable here.
The argument for plaintiff is, in substance, that defendant, who
had in fact no expectation of a harmful result, ought to have expected
or foreseen the probability of such a result, and that hence the law
should treat him as if he actually had foreseen it; and that then it fol-
lows that he should be treated as having intended the result.
This argument involves not merely fiction, but double fiction-
fiction twice applied. "Constructive knowledge" is brought in as a
71 Salmond, Torts (1st ed.) 18-19.
72 See article by the present writer (cited in note 15, supra) 60 U. oP PA. L.
REv. 365, 386.
73Salmond, Jurisp. (ed. 1902) 448.
14 2 Stephen, Hist. of Crim. Law of Eng. 360. And compare Bishop, New
Grim. Law, s. 313.
"I Upon this point there is a conflict of authority. See cases cited in 21 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 427-442, n. It is not proposed here to discuss the main question of
liability; but only to consider the soundness of one reason sometimes given to
sustain a decision against the defendant.
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basis for "constructive intent"; there is an inference from another
inference, a presumption resting on the basis of another presumption."6
The fallacy of this argument becomes apparent when it is analyzed
and reduced to its lowest terms, as follows:
1. Because defendant ought to have foreseen what he did not fore-
see, the law should hold that he "constructively" foresaw.
2. Because he "constructively" foresaw, he must be regarded as
having "constructively" desired what he "constructively" foresaw.
Or in this form:
1. Presume that defendant foresaw what it is admitted he did not
foresee; and then,
2. Because he is thus presumed to have foreseen what he did not
foresee, he must further be presumed to have desired what he neither
foresaw nor desired.77
EXAMPLE FOUR: As to the doctrine of implied malice in criminal
law.
Its use in criminal law has been mainly confined to one department,
homicide, and there it has been productive of confusion, and sometimes
of unjust results.
At a very early day the presence or absence of "malice afore-
thought" was taken as a test to distinguish between murder and man-
slaughter; "but experience soon showed that the test was a rough
one, and failed in many cases." "
' See 2 Chamberlayne, Mod. Law of Evid. s. 1029.
7T, .I . it cannot be conceived, in the nature of things, how a purpose to
accomplish a given result can be imputed to mental conditions, the very essence
of which is the absence of all thought on the particular subject. . .. to
imply a purpose to do a thing from inadvertence in respect of it, is a contradic-
tion in terms." McClellan, J,, in Georgia Pacific Ry. v. Lee (1890) 92 Ala. 262,
270
"To say that negligence oi heedlessness may run into intention, is to say that
a thought may be absent from the mind, and yet (after a fashion) present to
the mind" I Austin, Jurisp. (3d ed.) 442.
" '"What is malice aforethought? Is there any malice that is after thought?"
1 Edward Livingston, Works on Crim. Jurisp. 309.
"The word 'aforethought' in the definition of murder, has been held to mean
almost, if not quite, nothing." 2 Bishop, New Crin. Law, s. 677.
the word 'aforethought' is practically unmeaning." 2 Stephen, Hist.
of Crim Law of Eng. 119.
"1 I . the words 'aforethought,' 'prepense,' 'deliberate,' in the established
definition have no real meaning, inasmuch as the state of mind which causes the
act must of necessity precede it." 3 Stephen, op. cit. 70.S* . the word aforethought is unfortunate, . . . The word afore-
thought countenances the popular error that a deliberate premeditated design to
kill is required in order to constitute the guilt of murder, whereas it is only
one out of several states of mind which have that effect. It is, moreover, an
unmeaning word, for the thought, the state of mind, whatever it is, must precede
the act; and it precedes it equally, whether the interval is a second, or twenty
years." Stephen, General View of Crim. Law of Eng. (1st ed.) 118, 119.
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"In order to meet such cases without sacrificing the established
definition, the doctrine of implied malice was invented." 9 "The
very meaning of the fiction of implied malice in such cases at com-
mon law was, that a man might have to answer with his life for
consequences which he neither intended nor foresaw. To say that he
was presumed to have intended them, is merely to adopt another
fiction, and to disguise the truth." o Some of the results reached in
this way (by the application of this fiction) were intrinsically just;
but this was not so as to all the results. In one or more classes of
cases the result is now disapproved ;8' and in other cases the prisoner
could well have been held guilty, "apart altogether from the artificial
doctrine in question," and according to ordinary principles without
the aid of fiction.82
"The modem tendency is to restrict, if not to disregard" the doc-
trine of implied malice. It does not furnish a basis from which to
reason by analogy. A recent writer goes so far as to express the
opinion that it may be regarded as now "discredited and obsolete." R3
There is a growing tendency to discard the terms "malice,"
"malice aforethought," and "implied malice." This tendency is apparent
in the Draft of an English Criminal Code, printed in 1879. (The pro-
posed code was never enacted, but deserves great consideration from
the eminence of the codifiers, who were appointed by a Royal Com-
mission.) In that draft the expression "malice aforethought" is not
used. The commissioners who prepared the draft substituted
"a definite enumeration of the states of mind intended to be
taken as constituent elements of murder for a phrase which is
never used except to mislead or to be explained away." 84
The use of the word "malice" is avoided throughout the English
Draft Code, as it is in the Indian Penal Code.s 5 In their Report the
English Commissioners say:
T9 Stephen, General View of trim. Law of Eng. (1st ed.) 43, 44.
80 Holmes, J., Com. v. Pierce (1884) 133 Mass. 165, 178.81 See 2 Bishop, New Grim. Law, s. 681; 3 Stephen, Hist. of Grim. Law of
Eng. 71, 75; Stroud, Mens Rea, 176; Stephen, General View of Crim. Law of
Eng. (1st ed.) 119; 2 Chamberlayne, Mod. Law of Evid. ss. 1138-1142, 1145-1149;
Prof. Joel Parker, 72 NORTH AM. REv. 187, 188, 192, 198-202.
2 See Stroud, Mens Rea, 182 et seq., 185.
so See Stroud, Mens Rea, 172, 181-182.
84 3 Stephen, Hist. of Crim. Law of Eng. 83.
"It is much better, in defining murder, to state directly what acts or states of
mind are forbidden than to call them malicious and then have to go on and
explain that 'malice' does not really mean malice but something quite different."
Terry, Leading Ptinciples of Anglo-American Law, s. 220.
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"It seems to us that the law upon this subject ought to be
freed from the element of fiction introduced into it by the
expression 'malice aforethought,' . .
The word "malice" is not used in the definition of murder in the
Penal Code drafted by Edward Livingston for the State of Louisiana
(never enacted)."
EXAMPLX Fivr: As to the fiction of conclusive presumption of
intent, stated as affording the reason for the doctrine of trespass ab
initio.
That doctrine is, in substance, as follows:
He who under authority of law enters upon another's land,8 and
is subsequently guilty of an abuse of that authority by committing a
wrong of misfeasance s, against the owner, is deemed to have entered
originally without authority, and is therefore liable as a trespasser
ab initio for the original entry itself, as well as for all damaging acts
subsequently done by him thereunder. By the subsequent abuse, he
forfeits the protection which the law would otherwise give to the
original entry. The abuse of the authority not only terminates it, but
revokes it retrospectively, so that it is deemed never to have existed.89
But if one enters under an authority in fact, given by the owner,
his subsequent abuse of that authority does not make him liable as a
trespasser for the original entry. He is liable only for abuse or mis-
conduct occurring after entry.
It has been said that the rule of trespass ab initio was "primarily
one of procedure," authorizing the maintenance of an action of tres-
pass quare clausum fregit for the entire damage including the original
entry, instead of an action on the case for the subsequent abuse only.
In view of modern procedural changes, the question as to the form of
action under the old system is not now of practical importance. But
the rule did not merely affect the form of action under the old pro-
cedure. It created a substantive liability which would not otherwise
exist. And
"its secondary effect upon the substantive law still remains, viz.,
that it enables the plaintiff to recover damages for the entire
See Report of Commissioners, 15, 23, 24.
*6 See 2 Complete Workr of Edw'ard Livingston on Criminal Jurisp. 147, art.
537. As to the learned codifier's reasons for the omission, see Vol. 1, p. 307-
310 As to the objections to the use of the term "implied malice" in the law of
defamation, see quotations cited in the paper by the present writer in 60 U. op
PA. L Rsv. 461-463.
* The doctrine does not apply merely to entry upon land.
*" A positive wrongful act, as opposed to a mere omission or non-feasance."
See definitions in text-books; especially Salmond, Torts (lst ed.) 167;
Cooley, Torts (2d ed.) 371-372.
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transaction, and not merely for the wrongful portion of it" (the
abuse subsequent to the entry) .2
For this doctrine of trespass ab initio two prominent reasons or
explanations are given.
1. The subsequent abuse of the right conferred by law gives rise
to a conclusive presumption that an intent to abuse the authority existed
at the time of the original entry.
2. A ground of public policy to be briefly referred to later.
Here we are concerned only with the correctness or sufficiency of
the first reason, i. e., the presumption as to the original intent.
An early statement of this reason is found in the leading case of
The Six Carpenters m
" . . in the case of a general authority or license of
law, the law adjudges by the subsequent act, quo animo, or to
what intent, he entered; for acta exteriora indicant interiora
secreta."
This view has been restated in various forms:
"The presumption of law is, that he who thus abuses such
an authority assumed the exercise of it in the first place for the
purpose of abusing it." 92
e .t. it is presumed, from the misbehavior of the
licensee, that he entered originally with the intent to do the
wrong he has actually committed, and not in good faith under
his license." 9
"He is said to be a trespasser ab initio, on the assumption
that his subsequent misconduct evidences an intention from the
first to commit unlawful acts under the color of a lawful
authority." 4
the original intent was presumed conclusively
from the subsequent conduct." 9
This presumption has practically been regarded as a conclusive
presumption, although the word "conclusive" may not have been used
in stating it. It is treated as irrebuttable.
There is no ground for a conclusive presumption in cases of this
nature generally. In some instances a jury might be justified in finding
the fact of the existence of such an intent, e. g. where the abuse fol-
lowed closely upon the original entry and was of an extreme nature.
Subsequent misconduct may, in particular cases, be held to afford some
evidence of original intent. But that is a very different thing from
6°See 1 Salmond, Torts (st ed.) 168; Bigelow, Torts (7th ed.) But com-
pare Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, 244.
" (1610) 8 Coke, 146a, 146b.
21 Water, Trespass, s. 493.
"Cooley, Torts (2d ed.) 371.
"Clerk & Lindsell, Torts (2d ed.) 165.
"Holmes, J., Com. v. Rubin (1896) 165 Mass. 453, 455.
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holding that it gives rise in all cases to a conclusive legal presumption
of original intent.
Modern writers who have given attention to the question prac-
tically agree in calling the "presumption" a fiction, "an artificial assump-
tion."
"This artificial assumption in many cases does not accord
with the real justice of the case." "66 *ni*o by a fiction of law to make him a trespasser
a legal fiction due to the misplaced ingenuity of
some medieval pleader . . ." s
an artificial presumption to the effect that the
subsequent abuse was evidence of a wrongful intent from the
beginning, .. . "*
"An artificial difficulty was thus overcome by artificial
means." 100
The theory that the law will invariably infer the original wrongful
intent from the subsequent act of abuse, was stated in the Six Car-
penters' Case' 0 ' as a ground for distinguishing the case of authority
given by law from that given in fact, and for applying the rule of
trespass ab initio to the former case but not to the latter. This ground
of distinction 102 has been strongly criticised. It is said that this rea-
son "applies equally to both cases," and that it is not easy to see why
intent from the beginning to abuse authority may not be as readily
inferred in the one case as in the other."". In Hammond, Nisi Prius
(Eng. ed. of 1816) it is forcibly said:
. . .if the nature of a subsequent act of trespass was
indicative of a previous evil intent, it must be so not only in the
instance where it has been perpetrated in executing an authority
in law, but likewise when it has been committed in fulfilling an
authority in fact."
Does the rejection of this fiction reason (conclusive presumption
of original intent) necessitate the abandonment (the elimination from
the law, the legal annihilation) of the doctrine of trespass ab initio?
If it does have that effect, the result will not be regretted by some
leading jurists. Prof. Salmond 104 and Judge Holmes 105 have indicated
their willingness to get rid of the doctrine.
I Clerk & LindselU, Torts (2d ed.) 165.
91 Bigelow, Torts (7th ed.) s. 490.
9 Salmond, Torts (1st ed.) 168.
" I Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, 47.
Id. 47.
'o' (1610) 8 Coke 146a.
1n2 "a curious and rather subtle distinction." Pollock, Torts (6th ed.) 379.
x" See note in 14 Am. Dec. 365.
104 Torts (1st ed.) 168.
106 The Path of the Law (1897) 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 469.
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But it would not necessarily have that effect. Another reason has
been given for the doctrine, and, whether entirely satisfactory or not,
it is certainly a better reason than the fiction of presumed intent. It
is founded upon general considerations of policy, and has been stated
in substantially the following form:
"When the law gives one man an authority to enter upon
or take possession of another's property against the owner's will,
it must provide ample safeguards against the abuse of the
authority, since it disarms the owner of the power of protecting
himself. But where the owner himself gives the authority, the
means of protection are in his own hands." 108
Where
"an authority in law is delegated to another, the privilege is
conferred upon this implied condition, that he does not convert it
into an instrument of oppression."
(To be continued)
JEREMIAH SMITH
(Yale Law Journal, Vol. XXVII, No. 2, December, 1917.)
106 14 Am. Dec. ed. n. p. 365. Compare 6 Bac. Abr. (6th ed.) 561, Title "Tres-
pass B"; Hammond, Nisi Prius (Eng. ed. of 1816) 54, 55.
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